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SALLY YATES, RONALD DWORKIN, AND THE 
BEST VIEW OF THE LAW 
W. Bradley Wendel* 
INTRODUCTION 
Before January 30, 2017, Acting Attorney General Yates was relatively 
unknown, but her actions on that day ensure her name will now be remem-
bered by generations of lawyers and law students. A holdover from the 
Obama Administration, Yates headed the Department of Justice, pending 
the confirmation of Senator Jeff Sessions for the position of attorney gen-
eral.1 During President Trump’s first week in office, he issued an executive 
order prohibiting entry into the United States of all refugees and citizens 
from seven Muslim-majority countries, even those with lawful permanent 
residence in the United States.2 The order was subsequently enjoined na-
tionwide by a district judge in the Western District of Washington, and that 
injunction was upheld by the Ninth Circuit.3 But rather than examine the 
litigation path of the executive order, let us remain with Yates. Three days 
after Trump signed the executive order, Yates wrote a letter to lawyers in the 
Department of Justice stating that the Department would not defend it.4 The 
letter read, in part: 
[I]n litigation, DOJ Civil Division lawyers are charged with advancing rea-
sonable legal arguments that can be made supporting an Executive Order. 
But . . . [m]y responsibility is to ensure that the position of the Department 
of Justice is not only legally defensible, but is informed by our best view of 
what the law is after consideration of all the facts. In addition, I am respon-
sible for ensuring that the positions we take in court remain consistent with 
 
 * Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. 
 1. E.g., Michael D. Shear et al., Trump Fires Acting Attorney General Who Defied Him, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/us/politics/trump-
immigration-ban-memo.html [https://perma.cc/WET7-EWEE]. 
 2. See, e.g., Michael D. Shear et al., Judge Blocks Trump Order on Refugees Amid Chaos 
and Outcry Worldwide, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/28/us/
refugees-detained-at-us-airports-prompting-legal-challenges-to-trumps-immigration-
order.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/B3VQ-732H]. 
 3. See Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 
2017), stay pending appeal denied, No. 17-35105, 2017 WL 526497 (9th Cir. Feb. 9, 2017). 
 4. Shear et al., supra note 1. 
March 2017] Sally Yates and the Best View of the Law 79 
this institution’s solemn obligation to always seek justice and stand for 
what is right. At present, I am not convinced that the defense of the Execu-
tive Order is consistent with these responsibilities nor am I convinced that 
the Executive Order is lawful.5 
The lawfulness of the order is for the courts to determine. What interests 
me, as a scholar of legal ethics and jurisprudence, is whether Yates got it 
right when she said the responsibility of a lawyer for the government is to 
seek justice and stand for what is right, and that the position of the Depart-
ment of Justice should be informed by the lawyer’s best view of the law. 
Yates’s claim that legal advice should be informed by the best view of the law 
sounds very much like the position of Ronald Dworkin. Dworkin argued 
that a judge should determine the legal rights and duties of the litigants by 
constructing the best possible interpretation of the principles of justice, fair-
ness, and procedural due process, all considered from the standpoint of the 
community’s political morality.6 The judge’s interpretation must fit with past 
legal decisions, but its aim is also to show the community’s legal practices in 
their best moral light.7 I do not know whether Yates was thinking about 
Dworkin when she wrote her letter, but I wish to use this Essay to seek to 
persuade legal advisors—whether for the government or a private client—
that their role is not to construct an interpretation of the law that represents 
the best constructive interpretation of political morality but rather to serve as 
agents of their client. 
There are several reasons that lawyers should not be Dworkinian inter-
preters, but this Essay will concentrate on two. First, Dworkin’s jurispruden-
tial vision has always sat uncomfortably with moral pluralism. Dworkin de-
nies that his imaginary Judge Hercules merely imposes his own moral 
preferences under the guise of offering a legal interpretation.8 He insists that 
Hercules instead provides the best account of the community’s political mo-
rality.9 But he has very little to say about the possibility that a faithful recon-
struction of the community’s moral principles will potentially establish mul-
tiple moral narratives bearing on the same question of legal interpretation.10 
The American experience with immigration shows that, as a political com-
munity, we have a remarkable capacity for tolerating both expansive execu-
 
 5. Letter from Sally Yates, U.S. Acting Att’y Gen., to U.S. Dep’t of Justice Att’ys (Jan. 
30, 2017), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3438879/Letter-From-Sally-Yates.pdf. 
[https://perma.cc/KK25-TCS2]. 
 6. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 225, 239, 243 (1986). 
 7. Id. at 227–28, 248. 
 8. Id. at 259–61. 
 9. Id. at 263. 
 10. See Jeremy Waldron, Did Dworkin Ever Answer the Crits?, in EXPLORING LAW’S 
EMPIRE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF RONALD DWORKIN 155, 162–63 (Scott Hershovitz ed., 2006). 
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tive power and discrimination on the basis of nationality (and, as demon-
strated by the George W. Bush Administration, possibly discrimination on 
the basis of religion). As a community we also have become increasingly tol-
erant of strong executive power,11 but in the immigration context the presi-
dent’s plenary power goes back more than a century, to the Chinese Exclu-
sion Case.12 Litigation after the September 11 attacks set some limits on the 
president’s power, but left in place the deference given to the executive 
branch by the other branches on matters pertaining to national security. A 
program called the National Security Entry Exit Registration System 
(NSEERS), established by the Bush Administration, required the registra-
tion, fingerprinting, and questioning of aliens present in the United States 
from Muslim-majority countries, who were males over the age of sixteen. 
Courts sustained the registry features of the NSEERS program against due 
process and equal protection challenges, claims that the program amounted 
to racial profiling, and arguments regarding lack of statutory authorization 
for the program.13 That is not the only story, but it is certainly an aspect of 
our political morality that sits alongside the antidiscrimination norms ar-
ticulated in the Constitution and numerous judicial opinions. What is a law-
yer modeling herself on Judge Hercules to do when seeking the best view of 
the law? 
The second reason for disfavoring a conception of legal advising as seek-
ing the best view of the law is the need to preserve the legitimacy of law as a 
normative system that resists reduction to either political preferences or raw 
power. Writing in the Atlantic, conservative commentator David Frum ima-
gines the state of the nation on the eve of Trump’s inauguration in 2021 to a 
second term as president.14 Among many other moves in the playbook for 
accumulating power, Frum cited one particularly relevant to government le-
 
 11. E.g., Glenn Sulmasy, Executive Power: The Last Thirty Years, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 
1355, 1355 (2009) (“The last thirty years have witnessed a continued growth 
in executive power—with virtually no check by the legislative branch. Regardless of which po-
litical party controls the Congress, the institution of the executive continues to grow and in-
crease in power.”). 
 12. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889); 
see also Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Con-
stitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 550–52 (1990). 
 13.  See Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 433–34 (2d Cir. 2008) (describing program); 
Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2006); Ali v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 
2006). In a case not related to NSEERS, the Supreme Court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) pre-
cludes most selective prosecution claims by aliens. See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999). 
 14. David Frum, How to Build an Autocracy, ATLANTIC (Mar. 2017), https://
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/03/how-to-build-an-autocracy/513872/ [https://
perma.cc/77TF-5BN9]. 
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gal advisors: delegitimizing accountability-enforcing institutions by framing 
opposition as partisan. He discusses Trump’s tactic of repeating false state-
ments (now inevitably referred to as “alternative facts”) and then smearing 
fact-checking and neutral reporting as agenda-driven “fake news.” A certain 
amount of “working the refs” and complaining about the biased media is an 
innocuous part of politics as usual, but the conflation of truth with power 
risks undermining the raison d’être of independent journalism. As Frum 
writes, the best defense against authoritarianism is “an unwearying insist-
ence upon the honesty, integrity, and professionalism of American institu-
tions.”15 The legal profession’s capacity to resist the naked exercise of power 
depends on the perception that a difference exists between what is lawful and 
what is in someone’s interests, whether those interests belong to the presi-
dent or to some imagined cabal of liberal opponents. By referring to the ob-
ligation to “seek justice and stand for what is right,”16 Yates left herself open 
to the criticism that she was acting as a partisan who objected to Trump’s ex-
ecutive order on policy grounds, not an impartial gatekeeper advising the 
administration on the legality of its proposal. 
I.  DWORKIN ON THE BEST VIEW OF THE LAW 
Yates can cite respectable authority for the position that her role re-
quired her to provide the best view of the law. Two former lawyers in the 
DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) have argued that a legal advisor should 
seek the best view of the law.17 Their argument, boiled down, is that high-
level government legal advisors, such as those in the OLC, are acting in a 
quasi-judicial role.18 Interpreting the law and ensuring that government ac-
tors comply with it is not a job only for courts.19 The attorney general also 
interprets and applies the law, and in many cases, an opinion of the attorney 
general will be effectively final.20 The president retains the final authority re-
garding questions of executive branch legal interpretation;21 but to carry out 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. Letter from Sally Yates to Dep’t of Justice Att’ys, supra note 5. 
 17. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on 
Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559, 1579–80 (2007); Randolph D. Moss, Executive Branch 
Legal Interpretation: A Perspective from the Office of Legal Counsel, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1303, 
1309–12 (2000). 
 18. Johnsen, supra note 17, at 1579–80; Moss, supra note 17, at 1309–12. 
 19. Moss, supra note 17, at 1309–12. 
 20. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 
(1999); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 
110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Execu-
tive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994). 
 21. See TUSHNET, supra note 20, at 15. 
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his obligations under the Take Care Clause of the Constitution,22 the presi-
dent needs fair, reliable, well-reasoned advice. It follows that a government 
lawyer advising the president should assist the president in complying with 
the law, not merely finding a position that might avoid Rule 11 sanctions if 
asserted in litigation.23 
But what happens when there are competing accounts of what the law 
permits or requires? The president’s plenary power to regulate immigration 
is broad, and he enjoys significant statutory authority under the Immigration 
and Nationality Act to exclude “any class of aliens into the United States 
[whose entry] would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.”24 
But constitutional antidiscrimination norms may prohibit a travel ban that is 
specifically targeted at Muslims if the president’s decision was “motivated by 
discriminatory animus and its application results in a discriminatory ef-
fect.”25 Facially, Trump’s executive order applies only to nationality, but as a 
candidate he repeatedly stated that he would implement a Muslim ban.26 
Trump’s advisor, Rudy Giuliani, also stated in an interview that Trump 
asked him how to implement a Muslim ban lawfully.27 There is certainly evi-
dence—though its sufficiency is unclear—to support the unconstitutionality 
of the order as an instance of targeted discrimination motivated by animus. 
If the best view of the law is only that which reasonable lawyers would 
agree is the law, and if reasonable lawyers would agree the order is unlawful, 
then there would be nothing objectionable about Yates’s letter. My suspi-
 
 22. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“He [the President] . . . shall take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed . . . .”). 
 23. FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
 24. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2012). 
 25. Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Village of Ar-
lington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977)). 
 26. See, e.g., Jenna Johnson, Donald Trump is Expanding His Muslim Ban, Not Rolling it 
Back, WASH. POST (July 24, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/
2016/07/24/donald-trump-is-expanding-his-muslim-ban-not-rolling-it-back/?utm_term=
.0f1ed3cb6d14 [https://perma.cc/96LM-XGM6]; Jenna Johnson, No, Donald Trump Has Not 
Softened His Stance on Banning Muslims, WASH. POST (May 12, 2016), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/no-donald-trump-has-not-softened-his-stance-on-
banning-muslims/2016/05/12/6ec8d514-185c-11e6-aa55-670cabef46e0_story.html?utm_
term=.425ef7020cd2 [https://perma.cc/JKP6-TXXX]; Abby Phillip & Abigail Hauslohner, 
Trump on the Future of Proposed Muslim Ban, Registry: “You Know My Plans”, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/12/21/trump-
on-the-future-of-proposed-muslim-ban-registry-you-know-my-plans/?utm_term=
.8159a31acaf1 [https://perma.cc/B64A-LLLR]. 
 27. Rebecca Savransky, Giuliani: Trump Asked Me How to Do a Muslim Ban “Legally”, 
HILL (Jan. 29, 2017), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/316726-giuliani-trump-
asked-me-how-to-do-a-muslim-ban-legally [https://perma.cc/2KXR-FQ7P]. 
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cion, however, is that she was concerned there was a sufficient basis for con-
cluding the executive order was within the president’s constitutional au-
thority, but she regarded the order as morally repugnant. The tipoff is the 
reference in her letter to the DOJ’s purported “solemn obligation to always 
seek justice and stand for what is right.”28 In other words, I think Yates is 
trying to be a Dworkinian (if Hercules is Dworkin’s ideal judge, perhaps 
Yates was modeling herself after Athena). 
The trouble with the Dworkinian move is that it depends on an unrealis-
tic degree of consensus as to the community’s political morality. This is not 
incidental to Dworkin’s theory of law, but at the very core of it. Dworkin 
combines two inquiries that are often separated in jurisprudence: (1) What is 
the nature or concept of law, and (2) when does law rightfully obligate?29 For 
Dworkin it is true by definition that law must be legitimate. Law is that 
which licenses the use of force based upon past political decisions “of the 
right sort.”30 Decisions of the right sort are those that secure equality among 
citizens as members of a community whose political decisions reflect shared 
moral commitments.31 
Dworkin thinks a theory of law must walk a kind of tightrope between 
two dangers he calls conventionalism and pragmatism.32 Conventionalism, 
better known as positivism, is the view that law can be identified by its social 
sources, generally having been promulgated by political institutions such as 
legislatures and courts.33 In a nutshell, Dworkin contends that conventional-
ism fails at the justificatory task he sets for law: it does not explain why past 
political practices should be decisive of present rights and duties.34 But 
pragmatism also fails. A pragmatic theory of law would aim directly at moral 
considerations, such as efficiency, utility, or fairness.35 But pragmatism, ac-
cording to Dworkin, fails to give a nonstrategic explanation for why we have 
rights or, to put it differently, why principled decisionmaking is so central to 
our conception of a legal system.36 For Dworkin, genuine rights and duties 
depend on a foundation, not on anyone’s all-things-considered judgment 
about what people ought to do. A Herculean moral reasoner would not be 
Dworkin’s ideal judge. Rather, a judge ought to provide a constructive nor-
 
 28. Letter from Sally Yates to Dep’t of Justice Att’ys, supra note 5. 
 29. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 97, 190–92. 
 30. Id. at 93. 
 31. Id. at 96, 227. 
 32. Id. at 114, 151. 
 33. Id. at 114. 
 34. Id. at 116–17. 
 35. Id. at 151, 152, 160. 
 36. Id. at 180–83. 
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mative account that provides a reason to do something even if one disagrees 
as a first-order moral or political matter. 
Dworkin’s theory of law depends on the connection between, on the one 
hand, the demand for a principled justification for the use of coercion and, 
on the other, the capacity of common membership in a political community 
to legitimate the practices of a state.37 It aims to underwrite a conclusion tak-
ing the following form: even though the president believes considerations of 
national security require the travel ban, officials in the Department of Home-
land Security have an obligation to admit visa holders from the seven specified 
countries. What kind of reasoning could justify that proposition? Law pur-
ports to affect the practical reasoning of citizens subject to it, including gov-
ernment officials. The president, and presumably also his political appoin-
tees, have already reached a conclusion about what they think ought to be 
done as a moral and political matter. How can a conclusion of law supersede 
their conclusion? 
Dworkin’s insight, brought out in his critique of pragmatism, is that a 
legal conclusion cannot supersede if the proposition of law is merely the 
same type of judgment as the conclusion of moral reasoning.38 Although 
Dworkin does not use Joseph Raz’s terminology of first- and second-order 
reasons,39 he appears to have something like that in mind when he defends 
the obligations arising from membership in a political community.40 Con-
siderations such as justice play a role in the reasoning process that deter-
mines the obligations community members have, but they are not conclu-
sive.41 A legitimate conclusion of law depends on showing that it is the best 
constructive interpretation of the community’s political practices from the 
evaluative standpoint of political morality.42 A legitimate demand comes to 
its subject in the first-person plural: we have determined that we have a right 
to X and an obligation to Y.43 The law is therefore comprehensively inter-
twined with democratic self-governance. It requires obedience because it is a 
scheme of rights and duties that we, as a community, share. It is a commit-
ment to treat one another with respect and as equals, even when we disagree. 
 
 37. Id. at 191. 
 38. Id. at 180–81. 
 39. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 53–62 (1986) (arguing that authorities 
function by providing reasons that preempt the reasons that would otherwise have been con-
clusive for the subjects of the authority). 
 40. Id. at 263. 
 41. Id. at 203. 
 42. Id. at 263. 
 43. Id. at 189 (“[W]e are in some sense the authors of the political decisions made by 
our governors . . . .”). 
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Legitimacy demands that we offer each other principled reasons for the use 
of coercive state power. 
Dworkin’s conception of legitimacy presupposes the coherence of the 
community’s political morality. In my view, law ought to presuppose that the 
community disagrees about political and moral issues. For immigration, that 
includes the relative importance of a state’s identity as a nation and a mem-
ber of the global community, the balance between safeguarding national se-
curity and opening up to immigration, and the degree to which the executive 
ought to be able to make determinations about immigration and national se-
curity without the judiciary second-guessing it. The law is necessary precise-
ly because we are nowhere close to reaching agreement on these issues as a 
matter of first-order political morality. It is too much to ask for consensus, 
but Dworkin legitimacy requires a sufficient degree of coherence so that citi-
zens subject to the law can recognize, as suggested above, that the legal re-
quirement is our demand. Additionally, they must see the subjects of the law 
as members of the relevant “us” issuing the demand. The scope of the de-
mand for integrity is significant. Dworkin believes that Judge Hercules has to 
offer an interpretation that fits with the political decisions that have come 
before, including legislation and judicial opinions, and justifies them in the 
light of the community’s political morality.44 There may be some tension in 
the corpus of past political decisions, but the labor of Hercules is to show 
that they actually fit together as elements of a morally attractive “story worth 
telling now.”45 
To criticize Dworkin’s demand for coherence is not necessarily to assert 
the indeterminacy of law. It is perfectly clear that the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act grants broad authority to the president to make the type of de-
termination reflected in Trump’s executive order: 
Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of 
aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the 
United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall 
deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as 
immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any re-
strictions he may deem to be appropriate.46 
The Supreme Court has sustained the president’s plenary power against 
constitutional challenges based on racial discrimination and the First 
Amendment.47 However, it is also clear that sufficient circumstantial evi-
dence of discriminatory intent will support an equal protection or religious-
 
 44. Id. at 239, 263. 
 45. Id. at 227. 
 46. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2012). 
 47. Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 857 (1985); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 
(1972). 
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discrimination claim, notwithstanding the existence of executive authority.48 
The problem is not indeterminacy but pluralism. Hercules must somehow 
reach a conclusion that fits with the community’s past political acts—the 
facts of both expansive executive power in the immigration and national se-
curity arenas, and the constitutional prohibition on singling out a group or 
religion for unfavorable treatment. The conclusion must not only fit both of 
these strands of law; it must justify them with reference to our political mo-
rality, showing our political practices in their best light. Hercules may find 
the order repugnant, but in order to remain faithful to the community’s po-
litical-moral traditions and practices, he cannot avoid the deference tradi-
tionally given by courts to the other political branches in matters of immi-
gration and national security. Yet he must also acknowledge that the 
Constitution prohibits open discrimination that interferes with fundamental 
rights such as religion. 
From the point of view of a judge trying to tell a coherent, morally at-
tractive story, there are at least two narratives at work in the law of immigra-
tion and national security, each with its own characteristic political moral 
values. One emphasizes the necessity of a strong and vigorous executive to 
react quickly to danger and protect American citizens.49 The other fore-
grounds the vision of the United States as a nation of immigrants that, how-
ever imperfectly, has struggled to protect against discrimination on the basis 
of race, religion, and nationality.50 An attempt to tell the American political 
and legal story without an acknowledgement of both preexisting narratives 
would be incomplete. Any given judge has the opportunity to lean more 
heavily on one of these normative visions, but fidelity to the community’s 
history and values requires acknowledging the other. A philosopher with a 
less imperial vision of law than Dworkin, like H.L.A. Hart, would be willing 
to accept that at the margins of settled law, a judge has no option but to act 
frankly and creatively by establishing new law, not by interpreting law that 
already exists.51 Dworkin’s strong theory of associative political obligation, 
however, drives him to insist that Hercules provide a unitary account of the 
community’s political and moral commitments. 
 
 48. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533–35 
(1993); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–68 (1977). 
 49. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 32 (2d 
ed. 1996). 
 50. See 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) (2012) (“[N]o person shall . . . be discriminated against 
in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person’s race, sex, nationality, place of 
birth, or place of residence.”). 
 51. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 135–36 (2d ed. 1994). 
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II. NON-HERCULEAN LAWYERING 
Reconciling diverse strands of the American political-moral tradition as 
they are expressed in executive actions, legislation, and judicial decisions 
may be an impossible task for a judge—the thirteenth labor of Hercules, as it 
were. Fortunately, a lawyer is situated differently with respect to the values of 
legality, legitimacy, and integrity. The difference stems from the lawyer’s eth-
ical role as an agent of and an advisor to her client, and from the moral divi-
sion of labor between lawyer and client.52 The agency structure of the law-
yer-client relationship is not an afterthought, but one of the features that 
makes the role of lawyer ethically distinctive. Lawyers are obligated to act 
with reasonable competence and diligence to pursue their client’s lawful ob-
jectives, as defined by the client after consultation.53 A lawyer is free to coun-
sel the client regarding “other considerations such as moral, economic, social 
and political factors.”54 
As acting attorney general, Yates could have used her access to the pres-
ident to lay out a political and moral case against the executive order. For ex-
ample, she could have pointed out how vetting procedures for visa appli-
cants, including refugees, from Muslim-majority countries are already quite 
stringent, maybe even “extreme.” Yates could have said there is no need for 
haste in implementing the travel ban, and an immediate effective date may 
lead to chaos at airports and appear unnecessarily cruel. She could have not-
ed the appearance that the order is a “Muslim ban” may make our allies in 
the Islamic world understandably less likely to cooperate with the United 
States. And so on. There is nothing wrong, and a great deal right, with a 
high-level government lawyer having a conversation like this with the presi-
dent. But a lawyer, even the attorney general, is always fundamentally an 
agent of her client.55 Final responsibility for the “political, economic, social 
or moral” consequences of an action rests with the client, as a matter of the 
law of agency.56 
This moral division of labor characterizes the relationship between law-
yers and private clients. It is embodied in the distinction between the objec-
tives of the representation, which are for the client to decide, and the tech-
 
 52. See generally W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW (2010) (argu-
ing for a conception of the lawyer’s role’s morality that emphasizes the lawyer’s moral obliga-
tion of neutrality regarding the client’s ends and the means by which they are furthered). 
 53. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16(1)–(2) (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000). 
 54. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) [hereinafter MODEL 
RULES]. 
 55. See generally W. Bradley Wendel, Government Lawyers in the Trump Administra-
tion, 68 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2017). 
 56. MODEL RULES, supra note 54, at r. 1.2(b). 
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nical aspects behind the means of the representation, which are for the law-
yer to determine.57 The same vision of labor applies to the representation of 
government clients, but the observation above concerning pluralism further 
justifies it. What show a community in its best light, from the standpoint of 
political morality, are questions about “who we are as a nation,” “what we 
believe to be in the public interest,” and “what we would like our govern-
ment to do on our behalf.”58 These are quintessentially questions to be re-
solved by elections. Although one often hears that lawyers, and particularly 
lawyers for the government, should take into account the public interest 
while representing clients, it is often unclear how a lawyer should ascertain 
the content of the public interest. In the representation of government cli-
ents there is a ready answer. We determine what is in the public interest 
through the means of elections.59 If anything was clear in Trump’s campaign 
rhetoric, it was that he intended to curtail immigration significantly.60 When 
Yates purported to reach a conclusion of law based on considerations of 
what is just and right, she was required as an agent to base that decision on 
the client’s views of what is just and right. Like it or not, those views are now 
represented by the president’s policies regarding immigration. If the order is 
unlawful, as an instance of invidious discrimination or otherwise, then she 
should so advise the president. But a lawyer—even the highest-ranking advi-
sor to the government—does not have an open commission to serve the pub-
lic interest. Her obligation is to advise her client on compliance with the law 
and to leave the moral and political decisions to the client. 
Dworkin recognizes this problem and has an imaginary critic object that 
Hercules is substituting his own normative views of what the law should be 
for an interpretation of the law.61 I think Dworkin is right to say that there 
may be a case in which there are two or more competing interpretations of 
the law, all of which fit comfortably with past political decisions, among 
which Hercules must decide.62 In that case, Hercules has no choice but to re-
ly on his own belief about which interpretation is best from the standpoint of 
political morality.63 This seems like an unobjectionable thing for Hercules to 
 
 57. Id. at r. 1.2(a). 
 58. See DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 96–97, 428. 
 59. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers’ Ethics in a System of Checks and Bal-
ances, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (1987). 
 60. Louise Liu, Here’s Where President-Elect Trump Stands on Immigration, BUS. 
INSIDER (Nov. 9, 2016, 4:17 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/heres-where-donald-trump-
stands-on-immigration-2016-11 [https://perma.cc/NUP3-5CDT]. 
 61. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 259. 
 62. Id. at 261. 
 63. Id. at 263. 
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do. As H.L.A. Hart pointed out decades previously, sometimes judges must 
make a choice which is neither arbitrary nor mechanical.64 But this response 
risks undermining the legitimacy of law where the law’s claim to legitimacy 
is its foundation in our political morality. When Yates said she would direct 
the Justice Department not to enforce the executive order because it was not 
the best view of the law, a Dworkinian would hear her as asserting that it was 
not best from the point of view of political morality. This has to be the case 
because, as noted above, Trump’s interpretation is a plausible construction 
of the scope of the president’s statutory authority and plenary power over 
immigration.65 To assert that it is not the “best” view of the law, then, would 
be to assert that it is inconsistent with the political morality of our communi-
ty as a whole. That is where Yates exceeded the limits of the ethical rights 
and responsibilities of her role. She was required to provide the president 
with candid and competent legal advice, but the question of coherence with 
our community’s political morality is one which the democratic process en-
trusts to elections and whatever mandate they provide to the president for 
setting the normative agenda. 
CONCLUSION 
National security scholar and former OLC attorney Marty Lederman ar-
gues that Yates’s critics are picking semantic nits when they focus on Yates’s 
use of the phrase “wise or just” to claim that a government attorney should 
seek the best view of the law.66 The best way to read Yates’s letter, he argues, 
is as a contention that the executive order is unconstitutional because the 
president was motivated by religious discrimination. But Yates did not want 
to come out and say that directly. She did say she was not “convinced that 
the Executive Order is lawful,” so perhaps her reference to morality and jus-
tice was merely a rhetorical flourish.67 The “best view of what the law is” lan-
guage may simply indicate that any lawyer has an obligation of competence, 
candid communication, and independent judgment.68 Surely an ethical law-
 
 64. See HART, supra note 51, at 204. 
 65. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text. 
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yer would not want to provide only her second-best judgment about what 
the law requires. 
This reading of Yates’s letter may be persuasive, but the reason for com-
posing this short Essay, with the seemingly quixotic discussion of Dworkin, 
was to distinguish sharply between a government action that is “[s]tupid but 
legal” and one that is unlawful, full stop.69 Dworkinian jurisprudence invites 
this confusion, and I am afraid Yates’s letter will set a bad example for other 
government lawyers advising the executive on the legality of proposed ac-
tions. There may be a legal argument, avoiding the detour into political mo-
rality, that the travel ban is unconstitutional because it is motivated by invid-
ious discrimination. Alternatively, it could be within the president’s broad 
plenary power and statutory authority. By trying to become Hercules, Acting 
Attorney General Yates gave insufficient attention to the fundamental re-
sponsibility of any attorney: to provide candid advice to her client on what 
the law permits or requires, and to repose the responsibility with the client 
for the political and moral consequences of his decision. 
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